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COMMENT ON SHIFFRIN’S THINKERBASED APPROACH TO FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
T.M. Scanlon*
A constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech is a
limit on government policies that is deemed necessary to protect
certain important values. Even among those who believe in
freedom of speech, and believe that any defensible constitution
has to include a protection of this kind, there is considerable lack
of clarity and disagreement about exactly how the relevant
values are best understood. So one central task of a theory of
freedom of speech is to offer a clear account of what these values
are and why we should care about them. The judicial decisions
that make up the constitutional jurisprudence of a country in
which freedom of speech is recognized as a constitutional right
will involve a series of partial answers to these questions. One
thing that a theory of free speech might try to do is to knit these
partial answers into a coherent whole. As Shiffrin makes clear at
the outset of her excellent essay, this is not her task. Her aim,
rather, is the purely normative one of describing the values that
really do make speech important and freedom of speech an
essential ingredient in any defensible constitutional order.
Any account of the values supporting freedom of speech
needs to have a certain degree of abstraction. The right to speak
becomes controversial when there is disagreement about the
merits of the speech in question, and a defense of the right to
speak needs to appeal to some value that both sides of this
disagreement have reason to recognize. For example, people
may disagree about the merits of speech advocating (or
opposing) tax cuts, or speech advocating (or opposing)
anarchism. A policy defending the freedom to speak of various
partisans to these debates needs to appeal to a value that
abstracts from these disagreements, such as the value of being
* Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity,
Harvard University.
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able to participate in politics by expressing one’s opinion about
important questions of public policy. To take an example from
an adjacent area: people disagree about the merits of various
forms of religion and religious practice. A policy of tolerance is
therefore naturally defended by appealing to the more abstract
value of living according to one’s religious beliefs, whatever
these may be.
Shiffrin’s defense of freedom of speech carries this method
of abstraction to a high level. The value that the right of freedom
of speech protects is in her view the value of “the free
1
development and operation of [one’s] mind.” The many
different things that count as speech and are protected by
freedom of speech “serve the fundamental function of allowing
an agent to transmit (or attempt to transmit so far as possible)
the contents of her mind to others and to externalize her mental
contents in order to attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or
2
react given contents as authentically one’s own.” Transmission
and externalization of this kind is essential, Shiffrin argues, to
the development and exercise of one’s mental abilities.
She lists a number of other more specific interests that we
have as thinkers, for which speech is essential. These include:
a. A capacity for practical and theoretical thought:
developing her mental capacities to be receptive of,
appreciative of, and responsive to reasons and facts in
practical and theoretical thought, i.e. to be aware of and
appropriately responsive to the true, the false, and the
unknown.
b. Apprehending the true: believing and understanding
true things about herself, including the contents of her
mind, and the features and forces of the environment
from which she emerges and in which she interacts.
c. Exercising the imagination: in addition, rational
agents have interests in understanding and intellectually
exploring non-existent possible and impossible
environments. . . .
d. Becoming a distinctive individual: developing a
personality and engaging more broadly in a mental life
that, while responsive to reasons and facts, is
distinguished from others’ personalities by individuating
1. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011).
2. Id. at 295.
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features, emotions, reactions, traits, thoughts, and
experiences that contribute to a distinctive perspective
that embodies and represents each individual’s
separateness as a person.
e. Moral agency: acquiring the relevant knowledge
base and character traits as well as forming the relevant
thoughts and intentions to comply with the
requirements of morality. (This interest, of course, may
already be contained in . . . (a-c)).
f. Responding authentically: Pursuing (a-e) through
processes that represent free and authentic forms of
internal creation and recognition . . . .
g. Living among others: Living among other social,
autonomous agents who have the opportunities to
develop their capacities in like ways . . . .
h. Appropriate recognition and treatment: being
recognized by other agents for the3 person she is and
having others treat her morally well.
These interests are already quite abstract, but Shiffrin’s
account ties them together and grounds them in the yet broader
overarching interest in the “development and operation” of
4
one’s mind.
This account of the basis of freedom of speech has a number
of advantages. It appeals to a value that everyone is plausibly
held to share. As Shiffrin says, anyone who values him or herself
as a thinker must value the conditions necessary to the
development of his or her mind. Second, it supports a wide range
of protections. Accounts of freedom of speech that begin with
the importance of political speech—with the importance of
participating in politics and gaining information needed to fulfill
one’s function as a citizen—either leave other forms of
expression, such as artistic expression, out of the range of
fundamentally protected speech, or else squeeze them in by
some ad hoc stretching. By contrast, the value Shiffrin cites
covers virtually every form of verbal and written expression as
well as other forms of artistic activity. As she says, her view,
makes no important distinction, at the foundations, between
communication about aesthetics, one’s medical condition and
treatment, one’s regard for another, one’s sensory percep-

3. Id. at 288–90.
4. Id. at 287.
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tions, the sense or lack thereof of the existence of a God, or
one’s political beliefs. All of these communications serve the
fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit (or
attempt to transmit so far as possible) the contents of her
mind to others and to externalize her mental contents in order
to attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or react given
contents as authentically one’s own; further, they allow others
to be granted access to the information necessary to
appreciate the thinker, on voluntary terms, and to forge a full
5
human relation with her.

This breadth is an appealing feature. It might have been
achieved, however, simply by recognizing all of these diverse
interests as important. Shiffrin’s account has the added feature
of tying these together as aspects of a unified interest (or closely
related set of interests). But I have some doubts about how
much unity there is in fact in her account, and about how much
of an advantage such unity would be.
The interests Shiffrin lists are varied, but the emphasis in
her account is on what might be called self-development. She
mentions, for example, such things as “developing her mental
capacities,” “developing a personality,” becoming able to
comply with the demands of morality, “development of self and
character,” and “responding authentically.” Of course one has
interests in the exercise of one’s mental capacities for other
reasons—for example, one has interests in acquiring true beliefs
about aspects of the world because these are important for the
achievement of particular aims that one has. The reasons one
has to acquire true beliefs about different matters are varied and
of varying importance, depending on the subject matter in
question. A theory that tries to account for all of these reasons
by appeal to our interest in self-development seems to me
unhelpfully monistic and high-minded. It is like an account of
the importance of political speech that sees political activity to
be important because it is essential to the realization of our
social nature, leaving out our interests in affecting particular
policies, trying to influence who gets elected, and so on. If we
read ‘exercise’ in the phrase “develop and exercise one’s mind”
as allowing for this diversity of interests served by its exercise
the overall theory is less unified than may first appear. But this
loss in unity would in my view be a gain, since a theory of free
speech, if it is to guide us in setting the limits to public policy

5. Id. at 295.
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affecting speech, needs to take account of this diversity of
interests and their varying degrees of importance.
Shiffrin’s “thinker-based” theory bears an interesting
relation to accounts emphasizing interests of speakers, such as an
interest in being able to influence the opinions of others about
politics, religion, or some other matter; and to accounts
emphasizing “audience” interests such as the interest in having
access to information and opinion about various subjects. Her
emphasis on speech—on the “fundamental function of allowing
an agent to transmit (or attempt to transmit so far as possible)
the contents of [one’s] mind to others” makes Shiffrin’s view
6
sound at first like a speaker-based theory. But the primary
interests of speakers in freedom of speech are commonly taken
to include interests focusing on the effects that one’s expression
may have on others, such as interests in persuading them of
certain things, or, at least, making them aware of one’s views.
Shiffrin’s account is interestingly different, helpfully reminding
us that speakers also have interests concerned with the
importance of speech for them. Her list of our interests as
thinkers also includes things that would have occurred more
naturally on a list of audience interests, such as one’s interest in
acquiring true beliefs. All of this is just to say (not something
that I think Shiffrin would deny) that some of the interests she
lists are interests in freedom of speech, including the freedom of
others to speak, at least as much as interests in speech (that is, in
speaking oneself).
My own view of freedom of expression recognizes interests
we have qua speakers, qua audiences, and qua bystanders (that
is, people who are affected by expression but not as either
speakers or as audiences who have an interest in receiving the
7
message presented). So I agree with Shiffrin in rejecting
accounts that focus only on speaker or audience interests.
Earlier, I offered a view that, like hers, gave an important
place to an idea of autonomy, although I thought of the
8
autonomy in question as that of audiences. The role of
6. Id. at 295.
7. See T.M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979), reprinted in T. M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE
84 (2003).
8. See T.M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972) reprinted in T. M. SCANLON, supra note 7, at 14–15. Although the Millian
Principle was concerned with the autonomy of audiences, the overall theory I advanced
in that article took the interests of speakers and bystanders into account as well. I wrote,
“The theory of freedom of expression which I am offering, then, consists of at least four

!!SCANLON-272-SHIFFRINTHINKERBASEDAPPROACH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

332

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/17/2011 9:20 AM

[Vol. 27:327

autonomy in that theory was to provide a rationale for what I
called the Millian Principle, which Shiffrin discusses. The
function of this principle was to limit the considerations that can
be appealed to as possible justifications for laws restricting
expression. Specifically, it ruled out appeals to harm to
individuals that consist in their forming false beliefs or to the
harmful effects of actions that speech would lead people to
believe they had reason to perform.
I agree with Shiffrin that this principle is too restrictive. It
would, for example, undermine perfectly legitimate justifications
for laws against false advertising. This was among the reasons
that led me to reject the approach of that early article. It was a
mistake, I concluded, to base a limit on justifications of laws
9
restricting expression on a general idea of autonomy. An
account of freedom of expression needs rather to be based on
the diverse reasons we have, as potential speakers, audiences,
and bystanders to want ourselves to have access to means of
expression or want others to have such access. These reasons
vary, according to the subject matter being dealt with. An
account of freedom of expression needs to be sensitive to these
differences and also to empirical facts about the likely effects of
granting governments various kinds of regulatory authority.
This brings me to the question of how one gets, in Shiffrin’s
view, from an account of the value of speech to an account of the
content of freedom of speech—that is to say an account of the
limits this right places on government policies. Looking at the
matter in the simplest way, one might be tempted to understand
freedom of speech simply as a limit on governmental power to
ban speech of certain kinds or to burden it in various ways, such
as by allowing civil suits for defamation. But this is obviously too
simple. Freedom of expression also clearly requires the provision
of some benefits, such as police protection for unpopular
speakers. It is also compatible with, and can even require, limits
distinguishable elements. It is based upon the Millian Principle, which is absolute but
serves only to rule out certain justifications for legal restrictions on acts of expression.
Within the limits set by this principle the whole range of governmental policies affecting
opportunities for expression, whether by restriction, positive intervention, or failure to
intervene, are subject to justification and criticism on a number of diverse grounds. First,
on grounds of whether they reflect an appropriate balancing of the value of certain kinds
of expression relative to other social goods; second, whether they insure equitable
distribution of access to means of expression throughout the society; and third, whether
they are compatible with the recognition of certain special rights, particularly political
rights.” Id. at 22–23.
9. These reasons are explained more fully in Section III of Freedom of Expression
and Categories of Expression. Scanlon, supra note 7, at 93–100.
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on competing speech, such as time limits on speeches at public
meetings.
Beyond this, however, the values underlying freedom of
speech will also be promoted by, and even depend on, policies
that go beyond what freedom of speech itself requires. These
values can be promoted by such things as public schooling, the
Freedom of Information Act, longer opening hours of public
libraries, and public access to the Internet. So one question is to
what degree freedom of speech requires such things and, to the
degree that it does not, how the boundaries of what it does
require are to be drawn. I should say that I am myself uncertain
how this question is best answered, but it seems an interesting
question to ask about a proposed theory, particularly one that
defines the values at stake as broadly as Shiffrin’s does.
Shiffrin lists three ways in which “legal materials,” in which
she includes “laws, regulations, court rulings and resolutions,”
can be inconsistent with valuing the protection of individuals’
interest in “the free development and operation of [their]
minds:”
(1) the legal materials or the government activity may, on
their face, ban or attempt to ban the free development and
operation of a person’s mind or those activities or materials
necessary for its free development and operation; (2) the
effect of the legal materials or of the activity may
objectionably interfere with the free development and
operation of a person’s mind; (3) the rationale for the
materials, or the activity, may be inconsistent with valuing this
10
protection.

Her clause (1) most directly captures the idea that freedom
of speech limits governmental powers to ban speech. But this
clause also applies to bans of “activities or materials necessary to
the free development of one’s mind.” A ban on the education of
women and girls might count under this heading as a violation of
freedom of expression. Would a simple failure to provide
adequate public education to anyone also count? Alternatively,
perhaps a policy of not providing, or not adequately funding,
such education would count under (2) as having effects that
interfere with the free development and operation of citizens’
minds. Whether this is so would depend, I guess, on how broadly
‘interfere with’ is understood. Similar questions arise about a
policy of not providing materials of the sort required by the
10. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 287.
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Freedom of Information Act. This policy would have effects that
could be held to objectionably interfere with important
“operations” of citizens’ minds, if not, perhaps, with their
“development.” And a practice of banning access to important
documents by classifying them Top Secret might be held to
violate freedom of speech under (1) by banning “activities or
materials” needed for the free operation of citizens’ minds.
Clause (3) is potentially broader. The rationale for not
providing adequate public education might be that it is safer to
keep the masses uneducated. Or the rationale might be that it is
better, and more popular, to keep taxes low than to improve
education. Either of these rationales would, I would say, be
inconsistent with (properly) valuing citizens’ interest in the free
development and operation of their minds. Would one or both
of them be inconsistent with valuing the protection of this
interest? Does the question of whether freedom of speech rules
out such a policy depend on which of these rationales it is based
on?
Two kinds of breadth are at issue in these examples.
Focusing on speech, one question is the degree to which freedom
of speech requires the positive provision of factors that improve
citizens’ ability to speak meaningfully, and improve the quality
of public discussion. Second, moving from speech to thinking, as
Shiffrin does, government policies that interfere with our ability
to think well by spreading confusion and disinformation, or
through more radical means, are clearly objectionable. The
question, however, is whether this is best put by saying that such
policies are violations of freedom of speech.
Here I would note one possible difference between freedom
of speech and freedom of thought. As I said earlier, an account
of the protections required by freedom of speech needs to take
into account the differing weight of the reasons people have to
want to engage in different forms of expression, such as political
speech, religious and philosophical debate, and activities such as
insulting one’s neighbors or issuing commands to one’s criminal
confederates. Such an account also needs to be sensitive to the
degrees to which different forms of expression are likely to be
vulnerable to over-regulation or to partisan constraint if
governments have the power to restrict them. The fact that all of
these forms of speech involve the externalization of the contents
on one’s mind is too general to be a helpful guide. Where
freedom of thought is concerned, however, things are different.
We have a strong reason to object to the government’s
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interfering with the development and operation of our minds. In
this case the objection is perfectly general, and founded on the
very general value that Shiffrin emphasizes.
Shiffrin devotes much of her paper to arguing for the
importance of speech for the development of our mental
capacities. So it seems as she is offering an account of freedom of
speech. But the distinctive and important basis of her argument
lies in an idea of freedom of thought, and it is not clear that the
best approach to the latter is the best approach to the former as
well.
To reiterate, I am not certain what the correct answer is to
the questions I have raised about the boundaries of freedom of
speech. But would be interesting to know how Shiffrin
understands these boundaries, given the robustness of her
account of the underlying value.

